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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate to what extent the members of the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) act as if they had a 
national mandate, instead of acting in the interests of price stability in the euro 
area as a whole. The paper develops a simple rational choice model of interest 
rate decisions inside the Governing Council of the ECB based on national 
mandates, and tests it against a model based on a European mandate, using 
monthly data from January 1999 to July 2003. The paper concludes that the 
model assuming national mandates explains the data better, and derives some 
implications for the reform of the ECB and other pseudo-independent 
institutions such as the European Commission, especially in the eve of the next 
enlargement. 
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Introduction 
 
Interest rate decisions are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB, which 
consists of the members of the Executive Board and the governors of the 
National Central Banks. Like members of the European Commission, members 
of the Governing Council are forbidden to have a national mandate. They must 
not receive instructions from member states. Instead they must act 
independently in the pursuit of price stability in the euro area as a whole. In this 
line, the official broad lines of the ECB’s strategy were announced by its 
Governing Council on 13 October 1998. This strategy would aim at ensuring 
price stability in accordance with the EU Treaty (article 105). The single 
monetary policy would have an area-wide objective (price stability), and would 
be concerned with national developments only to the extent that these are 
significant for the area as a whole. 
 
However, each member state retains the power to appoint the governor of its 
National Central Bank. Member state governments also fight to ensure that 
appointments to the Executive Board, especially the job of President, go to 
nationals of their member state. Therefore, there are some reasons to suspect 
that members of the Governing Council of the ECB might act in the interests of 
their member states of origin as if they carried out a national mandate. To 
investigate to what extent this is true is the objective of this paper. 
 
This is an interesting question from both a practical and a scientific perspective. 
From the practical point of view, it is interesting for us Europeans to know how 
decisions affecting the price of our mortgage are determined. If the members of 
the Governing Council act in their national interests and the Governing Council 
is not representative, because in it big and small member states have the same 
weight, then nothing guarantees that the resulting policy will be in the interest of 
a majority of Europeans. This problem turns all the more interesting in the eve 
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of the next enlargement, which will bring to the EU 10 new members states, 
most of them small fast-growing economies. From a scientific point of view, the 
question of national or European mandates is also interesting because it does 
not only affect the governing bodies of the ECB but also a number of 
bureaucratic agencies, prominently the European Commission. If such 
organisations are characterised by hidden national mandates, the principle of 
equality of members states turns out to be incompatible with the benefit of the 
majority. Therefore, this paper goes beyond the ECB and gets into the dilemma 
between bureaucracy and democracy, between independence and 
representativeness. 
 
Unlike in the case of the Federal Reserve, voting inside the Governing Council 
of the ECB is secret, so it is not possible to know each member's position. 
However, the results of those decisions are public. So it is possible to make 
hypotheses on the motivations of the members and use the results of interest 
rate decisions to test alternative hypotheses, which is what this paper attempts 
to do. The paper presents a simple rational choice model of interest rate 
decision-making in the ECB under a national mandate hypothesis, and tests its 
predictions against those of another model under the null hypothesis of a 
European mandate. Interest rate decision-making is an ideal testing ground for 
such models because preferences for interest rates can be assumed to be 
unidimensional and single-peaked, i.e. each Governing Council member is likely 
to have an ideal interest rate which can be represented along a single line. 
 
The rest of this paper will be divided in three sections. The first section will 
present the basic assumptions of the model. The second section will test the 
model's results against those of an equivalent model based on national 
mandates. Finally, the third section will present the paper's conclusions and 
their implications, with special regard to the issue of enlargement. 
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1. The basic assumptions 
 
The main objective of monetary policy in the EU is price stability, in other words, 
the ECB has an inflation target (e.g. 2% of inflation). In order to achieve its 
inflation target, one of the ECB's instruments is the interest rates it charges to 
commercial banks.1 Lower ECB interest rates lead to increased lending by 
commercial banks, increased investment, increased aggregate demand and 
increased upward pressures on prices. Conversely, higher ECB interest rates 
lead to less lending by commercial banks, less investment, decreased 
aggregate demand and decreased upward pressure on prices. 
 
The ECB can observe current inflation levels and react accordingly, i.e. 
increase its interest rates if inflation is above target and reduce them if inflation 
is below target. Such adjustment mechanism can be represented by a so-called 
monetary policy reaction function of the form: 
 
*)( ππβρ −+=i ,         (1) 
 
where i stands for the ideal interest rate, π for the observed inflation rate and π* 
for the target inflation rate, and ρ and β are positive parameters. 
 
This reaction function can be simplified in order to obtain an econometric 
function: 
 
πββπρ +−= *)(i          (2) 
 
πβα +=i           (3) 
 
which is a is a particular case of Taylor's rule, for a pure inflation-targeting 
policy. 
                                                          
1 The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area is based on the control of a short term interest 
rate. In the case of Eurosystem the official interest rate that is the repo rate of the main refinancing 
operations (currently the minimum bid rate) 
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Let's assume that all the members of the Governing Council of the ECB share 
the same monetary policy reaction function, with common parameters α and β. 
Differences in preferences for monetary policy are still possible if members of 
the Governing Council carry a national mandate and there are differences in 
inflation rates (π) across member states. Such differences in inflation rates 
across member states are still possible in a common market with a single 
currency, because there are transaction costs (some goods are not tradable at 
all). Likely causes of such inflation differences are differences in growth rates, 
which can be due to differences in business cycles (e.g. due to asymmetric 
shocks) or to structural factors (e.g. member states with a lower GDP per capita 
tend to grow faster than those with a greater GDP per capita). Thus, each 
Governing Council member may have a different ideal interest rate, which 
maximises its utility, and its utility can be assumed to decrease as the actual 
interest rate moves away from his or her ideal interest rate (e.g. Meade and 
Sheets, 2002). 
 
Decisions in the Governing Council of the ECB are taken by majority vote. 
Because preferences for interest rates can be represented along one single 
dimension and can be assumed to be single-peaked, the median voter theorem 
applies. This theorem, developed by Arrow (1951), states that the median voter 
will be pivotal and his or her views will prevail. According to our model of 
determination of interest rate preferences (monetary policy reaction function) 
specified above, the relationship between inflation rate and interest rate 
preferences is increasing, so the Governing Council member with the median 
inflation rate will have the median interest rate preference. Applying the median 
voter theorem, the Governing Council member with the median inflation rate will 
be pivotal. Therefore, under the median voter theorem the relevant inflation rate 
will not be the mean of the euro area, but the median inflation rate of the 
Governing Council members.  
 
The figure of the President may also be relevant for a political model of 
decision-making inside the Governing Council of the ECB. For starters, the 
President has a casting vote in case of a tie. But, perhaps more importantly, the 
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President has a considerable degree of agenda-setting power which, as it is 
well known, can be even more important than voting power (see e.g. Riker, 
1986). All in all, the President is likely to have some additional influence in 
determining ECB interest rates as compared to a rank-and-file member of the 
Governing Council.  
 
In summary, we can assume that interest rate policy reacts to price 
developments. However, it is likely that there will be differences in inflation rates 
across euro-area member states. In a model based on a European mandate, 
the relevant inflation rate will be that of the euro area as a whole. Conversely, in 
a political model based on national mandates, the relevant inflation rate will be 
the median inflation rate among Governing Council members and possibly also 
the inflation rate in the President's member state. To find out which model 
explains reality better is the objective of the next section. 
 
2. Testing the national mandate hypothesis 
 
In the previous section we have presented the basic assumptions of our rational 
choice model of interest rate decisions by the ECB based on national 
mandates. In this section we will test our model against the benchmark model 
based on a European mandate.  
 
Table 1. Models of interest rate decisions by the ECB (OLS) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 2.96*** 2.71*** 3.43*** 2.74*** 2.94*** 2.61*** 2.57*** 
Euro area 0.75***   0.35 0.51**  -0.28 
Median  0.72***  0.42  0.51*** 0.71* 
President   0.31***  0.15 0.18** 0.22* 
R2 0.264 0.270 0.227 0.281 0.290 0.328 0.332 
Adj. R2 0.250 0.257 0.213 0.254 0.263 0.302 0.292 
     * p < 10% ** p < 5% *** p < 1%
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Table 1 presents different specifications of the regression equation (3) above. 
Model 1 is the null hypothesis, i.e. the benchmark model in which ECB interest 
rate policy reacts to inflation in the euro area. The estimated coefficient for the 
intercept (2.96) is very significant and has the correct sign. The estimated 
coefficient for the reaction to inflation (0.75) is significant, and has the correct 
sign. The model explains around one fourth of the variance in interest rates (R2 
= 0.26). 
 
Model 2 is a political model based on voting power alone. The estimated 
coefficient for the intercept (2.71) is very significant and has the correct sign. 
The estimated coefficient for the reaction to inflation (0.72) is also very 
significant, and has the correct sign. The goodness of fit is somewhat greater 
than that of model 1 (R2 = 0.27). 
 
Model 3 is also a political model, but based on the power of the President alone. 
The estimated coefficient for the intercept (3.43) is very significant and has the 
correct sign. The estimated coefficient for the reaction to inflation (0.31) is also 
very significant, and has the correct sign. The goodness of fit is worse than in 
both models 1 and 2 (R2 = 0.23). 
 
Model 4 is a hybrid model combining euro-area targeting with voting power. The 
estimated coefficient for the intercept (2.74) is very significant and has the 
correct sign. However, both the estimated coefficient for the reaction to euro-
area inflation (0.35) and to the Governing Council median inflation (0.42) are not 
at all significant, probably due to multicollinearity. The goodness of fit adjusted 
to take into account the number of variables is worse than in model 2 (adjusted 
R2 of 0.25 as compared to 0.26 for model 2). 
 
Model 5 is also a hybrid model combining euro-area inflation targeting with the 
power of the President. The estimated coefficient for the intercept (2.94) is very 
significant and has the correct sign. The estimated coefficient for euro-area 
inflation (0.51) is significant and has the correct sign, but the estimated 
coefficient for the President variable (0.15) is not significant. The goodness of fit 
is greater than in the previous models (adjusted R2 of 0.26). 
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Model 6 is a full political model based on both voting power and the power of 
the President. The estimated coefficient for the intercept (2.61) is very 
significant and has the correct sign. The estimated coefficient for the median 
inflation variable (0.51) is very significant and has the correct sign. The 
estimated coefficient for the President inflation variable (0.18) is also significant 
and has the correct sign. The goodness of fit is also greater than in all the 
previous models (adjusted R2 of 0.30). 
 
Finally, model 7 is a hybrid model combining euro-area targeting with both 
voting power inside the Governing Council and the power of the President. The 
estimated coefficient for the intercept (2.57) is very significant and has the 
correct sign. The estimated coefficient for euro-area inflation is neither 
significant nor has the correct sign (-0.28). Conversely, the coefficients for the 
Governing Council median inflation (0.71) and the President variable (0.22) are 
fairly significant and have the correct sign. The goodness of fit adjusted to take 
into account of the number of explanatory variables decreased with respect to 
model 6 (adjusted R2 of 0.29). All in all, the results show that, once political 
variables are taken into account, the euro-area inflation variable becomes 
redundant. 
 
In summary, political models fare better than those based on euro-area 
targeting, and both voting power inside the Governing Council of the ECB and 
the power of the President are relevant variables. Once the latter variables are 
taken into account, euro-area inflation does not significantly add to the model. 
Of course, these results should be treated with caution, since, as the R2 of .33 
makes evident, the model is a rough approximation to the ECB's monetary 
policy, which may be influenced by other variables which have not been 
included in the model.  
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3. Conclusions 
 
This paper has shown that a model assuming that members of the Governing 
Council of the ECB act in the interests of their member states of origin explains 
better the ECB's interest rate policy decisions than a model based on the 
interests of the euro area as a whole. In other words, the paper has shown 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the Governing Council of the ECB acts 
as if its members carried a national mandate. 
 
The implications of the paper are wide-ranging. If we accept the hypothesis that 
members of the Governing Council follow a national mandate, and the 
Governing Council is not representative because large and small member 
states have the same political weight in it, then nothing guarantees that the 
ECB's decisions will be in the interests of the euro area or of a majority of 
Europeans. If the Governing Council were representative, the inflation rate 
considered by its median member would tend to be similar to the mean inflation 
rate in the euro-area as a whole. But if the Governing Council is not 
representative, there is a great risk that on occasions the inflation rate in the 
median Governing Council member's country will be much different from the 
euro-area inflation rate.  
 
The are two different approaches to solve this problem. The first option would 
be to try to increase the independence of the members of the Governing 
Council, e.g. by not allowing the reappointment of the governors of national 
central banks nor their appointment for any public office in their member states 
of origin after having served at the ECB. The second option would be to 
increase the representativeness of the Governing Council, so that its decisions 
coincide with the interests of the majority in the euro area. In terms of our 
model, this would entail to ensure that the median Governing Council member 
and the President of the ECB come from member states with price 
developments as close as possible to the euro-area average. This could be 
done by weighting the votes of the Governing Council members, which has 
been ruled out by the ECB, or by  introducing a rotation system by which 
members of the Governing Council have a right to vote with different 
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frequencies, which has been the option adopted by the Council of the EU in 
March 2003, on a recommendation from the ECB (European Central Bank, 
2003). Another option would be to appoint the Executive Board by qualified 
majority in the Council (now this requires unanimity) , so that larger member 
states can be better represented. 
 
Any increase in the representativeness of the ECB's governing bodies should 
be linked to an increase in the transparency of their proceedings. A model 
based on representation requires that the principals are well informed of the 
behaviour of their agents. After all, the current system, where voting inside the 
Governing Council is secret, far from guarantees the independence of the 
Council members from national pressures because, in Willem H. Buiter's words, 
 
The information required to bring effective pressure to bear will be available, de facto, 
to the national political insiders. That information will not however, be formally 
available to the bodies charged with supervising the ECB (the European Parliament in 
the case of the ECB Board, and the national parliaments in the case of the national 
central bank governors of the Euro area). Council members will be able to hide behind 
the cloak of confidentiality, and to avoid having to justify or defend their yielding to 
local political pressures. The exercise of undue influence is not deterred by secrecy 
and confidentiality, but only by openness. Smoke-filled rooms and confidentiality are 
more likely to allow the ECB mandate an independence to be perverted by national 
political pressures than openness and the occasional short-term embarrassment that 
this entails (Buiter, 1998). 
 
The implications of this paper go beyond the ECB. For instance, the European 
Commissioners could also be subject to similar influence of national interests. 
An as in the case of the Governing Council of the ECB, the College of 
Commissioners is far from representative, and will be less so if large member 
states relinquish their second commissioner. Enlargement may aggravate the 
representativeness problem (Berger, 2002). However, this problem is already 
present, as our evidence has shown. Therefore, enlargement should not be 
seen as a risky enterprise posing problems for the institutional design of the EU. 
Rather, it should be seen in a more positive light, as a spur for the EU to 
undertake the institutional reforms that it currently needs. 
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